A. INTRODUCTION
In its 1992 Report on Family Law, the Scottish Law Commission proposed that greater legal recognition should be given to cohabiting couples by conferring the right to make certain claims to each other's property. 1 The Commission's view was based on the increased incidence of cohabitation throughout the UK and on the responses received during its consultation process. However, the rationale for the Commission's recommendations was not fully articulated; instead, it stated rather vaguely that there was "a strong case for some limited reform of Scottish private law to enable certain legal diffi culties faced by cohabiting couples to be is the degree to which apparently clearer justifi cations for reform have been put forward. This paper sets out to examine what these justifi cations are and to assess whether and how far the legislative framework may be understood to have met them. It also considers a series of broader questions. In particular, it asks whether a coherent understanding of the phenomenon of cohabitation is possible and, if so, what it might amount to. It also opens up areas of further research into what kinds of property rules might be appropriate to cohabitation.
B. THE CONTENT OF THE REFORM
Before going on to discuss whether, how far, or in what ways the provisions of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 meet the justifi cations made for them, we must fi rst set out the three areas in which entitlements are conferred on cohabitants.
In order to benefi t from those entitlements, a claimant must establish the existence of cohabitation. Section 25(1) of the 2006 Act defi nes "cohabitant" as either member of a couple consisting of -(a) a man and woman who are (or were) living together as if they were husband and wife; or (b) two persons of the same sex who are (or were) living together as if they were civil partners.
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In deciding whether cohabitation exists, courts are directed to have regard to: (a) the length of time the couple have lived together (though no minimum period is set); (b) the nature of the relationship; and (c) the nature and extent of any fi nancial arrangements which exist or existed between the couple. 8 Sections 26-29 then set out the three areas in which entitlements are conferred on a person qualifying as a cohabitant. property and cohabitation Vol 11 2007 general law that an item bought by a cohabitant on his or her own is owned by that cohabitant alone. 11 There is also a presumption of common ownership in money and property deriving from housekeeping allowances.
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(2) Financial claim on termination of cohabitation other than by death
Where cohabitation ends other than by death, either partner has the right to claim fi nancial provision from the other. 13 This can be a capital payment, calculated by reference to any economic advantage gained at the claimant's expense by the defender or by a child of the parties. 14 It can also include a contribution to the economic burden of caring for such a child.
(3) Financial claim on death of a cohabitant
This right only arises if the cohabitant dies intestate. 16 Although the cohabitant's claim takes preference over any legal rights of children (and could, in fact, leave them with nothing) it is postponed to the prior and legal rights of a surviving spouse. 17 In deciding whether to make an award the court must consider: the size of the estate; any benefi t received by the survivor triggered by the death of the cohabitant from a source outwith his or her estate; the nature and extent of other claims on the deceased's estate (e.g. children's legal rights); and any other matter it considers relevant.
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C. THE RATIONALES FOR REFORM
The Policy Memorandum which accompanied the Family Law Bill expressed the rationale for reform in the following terms: 19 The policy objective is to introduce greater certainty, fairness and clarity into the law by establishing a fi rm statutory foundation for disentangling the shared life of cohabitants when their relationship ends. However, the notion that the 2006 Act introduces a new dawn of legal certainty and clarity is problematic for a number of reasons, some of which are explored in this paper. Further, the suggestion that the reforms are motivated by and directed towards the achievement of fairness contains a number of sub-themes that serve rather to confl ate the issues and confuse the basic question of what the reforms are for. One of those sub-themes is fairness per se, seemingly based on the intuitive view that, whilst not wishing to give cohabitation the same status as marriage, there was something wrong with a law which, for example, gave no rights to claim from property left on the death of a partner, even after a lifelong cohabitation. A second theme emphasised in the Policy Memorandum is protection of the vulnerable, whether adults or their children. 20 This general theme was carried forward by the Justice 1 Committee during the progress of the Bill, at which point two further and more specifi c themes emerged: the needs of children for economic protection, 21 and the justice of granting fi nancial compensation to a party economically disadvantaged by the relationship. 22 All four themes are summed up in the Deputy Justice Minister's view that the function of the law is to be "protective and remedial". 23 A fi nal justifi cation, albeit of a different order, is that the reforms are a response to demographic changes and to a corresponding change in public opinion. 24 In addition to these general rationales, others, considered below, are specifi c to the presumption of common property in household goods. All of these rationales were subject to the more general constraint of keeping marriage distinct from cohabitation. 25 A further limiting factor was the inability of the Scottish Parliament to change rules regarding taxation where these might discriminate between cohabitants and spouses. A fi nal point is that the rationales seem remote from the sorts of argument which are commonly used to justify the allocation of property rights. 26 The desire to make the legislation fl exible enough to apply to a variety of different and distinct factual situations has actually created a lack of both certainty and clarity, a fact that will have an impact on public perceptions. property and cohabitation Vol 11 2007
(1) Legal certainty and clarity
The fundamental diffi culty with the legislation lies in the uncertainty as to when a couple living together are to be regarded as cohabiting and thus entitled to make claims on termination of the relationship. To the requirement in section 25(1) that they are living together as husband and wife or civil partners 27 (which is used in other legislation 28 ) are added other factors set out in section 25(2) which the court must consider in determining whether the parties are, or have been, cohabitants.
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First is the length of the relationship. Although a minimum period of two years was set out in an early draft of the Bill, the Act as passed does not prescribe any minimum period and it is presumably possible that a very short relationship could qualify as a statutory cohabitation depending on the court's assessment of the other factors.
The second factor is the nature of the relationship. According to the Scottish Executive:
30 By "nature" we seek to point towards those many factors (not all of which may be present in any given relationship) which refl ect a common life. These might include fi nancial arrangements, the use and maintenance of a joint home, the existence of and caring for any children of the relationship, any outward signs of commitment, the manner in which the couple present themselves as a couple to friends and wider family, and evidence of decisions or actions refl ecting expectations by the parties that they would remain a couple.
The fi nal factor is the nature and extent of any fi nancial arrangements, the focus here being on evidence of fi nancial interdependence.
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Even with this additional gloss on the defi nition set out in section 25 of the Act, the legislation still leaves considerable doubt as to the full range of factors which may be relevant as well as to the precise scope and meaning of terms specifi cally 27 The notion of what is involved in living together as civil partners is rather obscure. Vol 11 2007 the edinburgh law review used within the Act. In the light of uncertainties about the essential nature of marriage such as were highlighted by a recent "sham" marriage case 32 -including whether marriage is a matter of bare legal form, how consent is to be construed, whether cohabitation is necessary and how outward signs are to be interpreted -it is hardly surprising that providing a legal defi nition of cohabitation is no easy matter. As a consequence of social change, cohabitants no longer feel the need to hold themselves out as a married couple. Moreover, the defi nition of cohabitant (even as expanded by section 25(2)) suffers from precisely the same problems that led to the abolition of marriage by habit and repute. What is a suffi cient length of cohabitation? What if one of the parties denies that he or she ever cohabited or even intended to cohabit with the other, within the meaning of the Act? If cohabitation is agreed or established, on what date did it commence? As the qualifying condition for acquiring the status of "cohabitant", and thus for certain sorts of property claims, cohabitation seems as "inherently vague and unregulated" as irregular marriage.
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Since the existence of legally-recognised cohabitation is the foundation of the other rights conferred in the Act, it is unfortunate that the defi nition remains obscure; it is an obscurity that will, one imagines, make it diffi cult to give clear legal advice in many instances. An additional diffi culty is the lack of clarity over when cohabitation, if such it is deemed to be, starts. One assumes that if A moves in with B on 14 February, cohabitation will not exist as at 15 February or even, possibly, 15 August. Let us suppose that legal cohabitation did not begin until 14 July of the following year. What is the start date of cohabitation from which legal consequences follow? Is it 14 July (the date of legally-recognised cohabitation), or is 14 February in the previous year (when the parties actually began to live together)? Establishing this date has consequences for the sorts of claims that may be made under the Act on termination of the relationship.
Some of the potential problems with the nature and type of the property claims that may be made are now considered.
(a) Common property in household goods
At fi rst sight the provision on the presumption of common property in household goods -section 26 of the 2006 Act -is clear. 34 precise starting time for the operation of this presumption. As noted above, there are two possibilities: the start of any living-together and the start of legal cohabitation. If the latter is intended by section 26, then matters are reasonably clear (provided it is possible to fi x the date), though the presumption would not then satisfy the dispute-resolution objective identifi ed by the Scottish Law Commission 36 as the items not covered by the presumption would have been acquired longest ago and therefore, presumably, memories would be less clear as to whom they belonged. If the former is intended, this then leads to complications. What is the property position regarding household goods prior to legal cohabitation? Are they in the outright ownership of one or other of the prospective cohabitants?
37 Does the position change once legal cohabitation has been established so that the presumption of common property is backdated? If the presumption of common property is to be backdated, should each prospective cohabitant be regarded as a quasi-trustee for the other against the prospect of this happening or is their relationship to the property more like that of a mortis causa donee, subject to an obligation to take no action which might be detrimental to the position of the prospective cohabitant co-owner? These issues may not be of great importance during the cohabitation, but may be important after it ends where it is sought to establish what was to be presumed to be common property.
A fi nal doubt is how easy it will be to rebut the presumption: for example will it be overcome by producing a receipt showing who purchased the property? That the presumption can be overcome in this way is implied by the normal rules of property law in which ownership vests in the purchaser. Yet making the presumption so easily rebuttable is diffi cult to square with the suggestion that: 38 The justifi cation for this is that cohabitants, as much as married couples, set up home with a range of possessions for the use of themselves and any children as part of the same household. 36 See Scottish Law Commission, Report on Family Law (n 1) para 16.9. One function of the presumption was to resolve disputes when proof of actual ownership was lacking (especially where purchase took place a long time prior to the dispute arising). 37 Professor Kenneth Reid has suggested to us that, in the absence of the statutory provision, the common law would apply and, since this implies ownership from possession, there would be presumptive common ownership of all moveable property arising from the shared possession of the cohabitants. Of course, as Reid points out, this does not help to resolve ownership after the end of a relationship as, when possession is lost, so is presumed ownership. In fact we are not convinced that the presumption does apply here or operate in this way -no such presumption seemed to arise in the case of marriage (Harper v Adair 1945 JC 21) and the consequences of applying it in cohabitation are unattractive. It would apply to all cases of cohabitation (and include children) and extend beyond household goods to all property in the shared home (though this would depend on the answer to another question which Reid's suggestion raises: what type of possession is required for ownership to be presumed). Space does not permit a fuller discussion here and our point is simply to highlight some of the uncertainties arising from the statutory provision. 38 Scottish Executive, Family Matters (n 4) 29.
Vol 11 2007 the edinburgh law review Alternatively, should account be taken of whether the decision to purchase was a joint one (which might, of course, be evidence tending to support the existence of cohabitation in the fi rst place)? In the case of marriage, the presumption of coownership is not rebutted "by reason only that while the parties were married and living together the goods in question were purchased from a third party alone or by both in unequal shares". 39 This provision is omitted from the legislation on cohabitants on the basis that it "risks imposing co-ownership on them contrary to their wishes." 40 Yet in the context of marriage, the Scottish Law Commission pointed to the artifi ciality of allocating ownership to one or other spouse where which spouse purchases what may be purely contingent and the decision on purchase has in fact been a joint one; 41 and there seems no good reason why the same consideration should not apply in the case of cohabitation. As it is, the provision's absence puts pressure on what section 26 means when it applies the presumption to household goods "acquired" during cohabitation.
(b) Financial provision on termination otherwise than by death
Section 28 allows a possible claim for fi nancial provision where parties cease to cohabit. 42 One source of diffi culty is the need to establish cohabitation in the fi rst place. Another is that it is not entirely clear how courts will interpret the criteria they are given. As we discuss below in the context of the aim of protecting the vulnerable, 43 there seems to be a tension between the largely backward-looking intentions of the Executive and the requirement to take into account possible disadvantage in terms of earning capacity (including, it must be assumed, future earning capacity). In addition, it is not clear what factors will have to be taken into account in determining the "economic burden" of childcare. Is this to be restricted to actual costs or should it take account of the broader economic disadvantages of childcare such as present and future impact on earning capacity? It is also worth noting 
(c) Financial provision on death
Financial provision on death is regulated by section 29. 45 Again, the diffi culty here is in establishing the existence of cohabitation, especially when the process by which this is to be done is not clear. A practical issue is the administration of the estate. Presumably the executor will have to await the conclusion of any proceedings under section 29; but will the executor also have to wait six months from the date of death to see if such a claim is forthcoming in the fi rst place? The factors to be taken into account by the court in determining applications under section 29 46 give little practical guidance on how the value of any award is to be assessed, especially as the court can take into account "any other matter it considers appropriate". 47 The suggestion in section 29(4) that any award made can be no greater than that to which a spouse or civil partner would be entitled provides little further assistance. Indeed, it may complicate matters further if it is taken as a presumptive fi gure from which deductions are to be made to take account of the factors set out in section 29(3). 48 In addition, it seems reasonable to envisage that, assuming cohabitation is established and the estate suffi ciently large, the onus will shift to the defender to show why the surviving cohabitant should not receive the same provision as a surviving spouse. Aside from fi nancial provision on divorce (where the guidelines are much fuller and clearer, operating from an initial presumption), this sort of discretionary entitlement has never been a feature of Scots law and it is diffi cult to see how it contributes to legal certainty. Of course, as the Scottish Law Commission indicated, uncertainty may be the price which has to be paid for a system fl exible enough to cope with widely differing circumstances: 49 Where, as in the case of a spouse, there is a choice between a system of fi xed rights and a system of discretionary provision the advantages of a system of fi xed rights appear to us to outweigh the advantages of a discretionary system. Where, however, the relationship giving rise to the claim is of a less certain character and where, accordingly, the choice may have to be between a system of discretionary provision and no provision at all, we think that the disadvantages of a discretionary system are tolerable.
This conclusion represented a reversal of the position taken in the Commission's earlier Report on Succession 50 and was based on changes in the views of some of Vol 11 2007 the edinburgh law review those consulted, and on the suggestion that existing discretionary systems worked well enough in practice. 51 The emphasis on the relationship being of a "less certain character" is understandable in the context of the Commission's original proposals, which would have involved the court having to consider factors such as the length of the relationship, whether there were any children, and so on.
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However, it cannot function as a justifi cation in the scheme ultimately adopted by the Executive.
(2) Protection of the vulnerable
As already mentioned, a declared purpose of the reform was the protection of the vulnerable. It is not always clear who is to fall into this group. In some of the discussion that took place during the legislative process, reference was made to legal vulnerability, suggesting that the issue was mainly one of a disadvantageous comparison with married couples. 53 In other discussions, however, vulnerability extended to those who might be physically vulnerable because of their exposure to risk and harm, 54 or to those who might be fi nancially vulnerable when cohabitation came to an end.
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In respect of the fi rst of these (legal vulnerability), the legislation goes some way towards conferring rights on cohabitants, as already described. However, given uncertainties over the extent and possible value of these rights, there may be a question as to whether legal vulnerability has been satisfactorily removed.
How the legislation assists physical vulnerability arising from exposure to risk and harm is unconnected with its property provisions 56 and so beyond the scope of this paper. The third aspect of vulnerability (fi nancial vulnerability) is not much improved by the new presumption of common ownership in household goods, 57 for the value of the goods is likely to be low, and the relative ease with which the presumption appears to be rebuttable is a further defi ciency. Section 28, allowing for the possibility of fi nancial provision on termination of a relationship, is more important and more effective. But in considering its appropriateness as a method of addressing fi nancial vulnerability, one might ask how far the vulnerability of female cohabitants is structural, that is, the product of the overall economic and legal structure of society. If the problems are structural, then there is at least a question as to whether it is appropriate or effective to try to achieve redistribution of wealth in the individualised context of two cohabitants. 58 While, however, the purpose of section 28 was, presumably, to address any vulnerability which fl ows from the existence of the relationship, this is not captured clearly by the statutory requirement to weigh up economic advantages and disadvantages. Nor is it clear what the main focus of the assessment of a claim should be. The discussion in Parliament seemed to envisage that the assessment would be mainly backward-looking, in other words trying to assess the contributions and benefi ts given and received during the relationship. 59 This suggests a very limited approach, involving the comparison of contributions which are not really commensurate and where there is a historical tendency to undervalue certain types of contribution, for example the home-making contribution of the female partner. It is also possible that, as has happened in the past, disadvantages suffered during the relationship might be regarded as already compensated for by provision made at the time.
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The exception to this essentially backward-looking assessment is the requirement to consider, as part of the disadvantage suffered, the effect on the applicant's earning capacity. 61 This captures an aspect of relationship breakdown which has been regarded by some commentators as the most signifi cant potential effect of a relationship as far as the female partner is concerned. 62 It is also a detriment which will long outlast the relationship and will require a forward-looking assessment before any claim is determined. As Parkinson notes:
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[O]n separation, one partner leaves with his earning capacity intact while the other's earning capacity is not only hindered for as long as the children continue to live with her, but is impaired in the long term by the effects on her earning capacity of years of withdrawal from the workforce, or occupation in jobs which are most compatible with her child-rearing responsibilities. 
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No guidance is given on the relationship between the different parts of the assessment or on the process or basis for calculating effects on earning capacity. It remains unclear how the courts will apply the criteria for assessing whether any payment should be made and, if so, what size it should be. Of particular interest is how much they will focus on past contributions and how much on the forwardlooking consequences of effects on earning capacity. The main focus should be on the second, as being the principal form of disadvantage suffered by women at the end of a relationship. But cases will vary, thus highlighting the diffi culty of addressing issues of economic vulnerability by means of a criterion of relative economic disadvantage. Obviously, the success of an application under section 28 will be dependent on the availability of resources on the part of the former partner. This means that in many (possibly most) cases there may be little point in making a claim at all, with the result that objective fi nancial vulnerability will remain without a remedy. It seems worth adding that whereas windfall gains are available for distribution on divorce, fi nancial "compensation" for cohabitants is limited to a sort of net loss or gain
The fi nal means employed of addressing fi nancial vulnerability is the provision in section 29 for a claim to be made on the intestate estate of a deceased cohabitant. This has limitations, the most obvious being that it applies only in the case of intestacy (total or partial), and is limited by any claims available to a surviving spouse of the deceased. Why this is the case is not entirely clear. As noted below, there seems to be general support for such a claim even in cases where a will is left and where there is a surviving spouse, 64 and the original Scottish Law Commission proposal was for the right to be exercisable in all cases and not restricted to intestacy. 65 Quite why this proposal -which also appeared in the Scottish Executive Consultation Paper, Family Matters 66 -came to be limited to intestacy is not entirely clear, though comments made by a civil servant at a meeting of the Justice 1 Committee suggest two reasons. 67 One was to preserve a clear distinction between marriage and cohabitation; the other was the review of succession law being undertaken by the Scottish Law Commission. Both are slightly disingenuous: the fi rst because the discretionary nature of the claim already distinguishes surviving cohabitants from surviving spouses, the second because the existence of a review in an area of proposed legislation is not always seen by the Executive as an impediment to legislation which it considers necessary or desirable. 
(3) Protection of children
A further purpose of the reform was the protection of children. Some fi nancial protection is given by section 28 of the Act in the form of the possibility of making an application for an award to cover the economic burden of childcare after the ending of the cohabitation. 69 This, however, is subject to two limitations. The fi rst is that before any payment can be claimed it will be necessary to establish the existence of cohabitation, and it will not be all instances of living together and producing or accepting a child that will be classifi ed as cohabitation for the purposes of the Act. 70 The second is that it will be dependant on the availability of resources on the part of the person from whom the payment is sought.
While those accepted as a child of the family are, potentially at least, advantaged by the provisions of section 28 if the relationship between the parties terminates during both their lives, the children of a deceased and intestate cohabitant are potentially disadvantaged by section 29 in that their right to claim legitim and a share in the intestate estate may be displaced entirely by a discretionary award made to a surviving cohabitant. In part, this seems to refl ect the view of the Scottish Law Commission that it may be diffi cult to justify legal rights for children when most children will be mature by the time any claim comes to be made and will not be in fi nancial need. 71 Whether this is either true or relevant seems open to question. For example, it is far from clear that the justifi cation for legal rights for children has ever been the needs of those children. 72 Be that as it may, however, the possible exclusion of children by an award to a surviving cohabitant amounts to preferring the common life of partners to the common life of children and parents, 73 albeit that the rationale is not clearly articulated, far less justifi ed.
(4) Demographic change
There has been a signifi cant increase in the number of cohabiting couples in Scotland. There is also evidence of considerable misunderstanding on the part of the general public as to the legal position of cohabiting couples. recent survey showed that 22% of those surveyed thought that, after a long period of cohabitation, cohabitants had the same rights to fi nancial support as married couples. 74 It is worth noting, however, that this lack of understanding seems to be diminishing: in 2000 as many as 35% of respondents shared the same mistaken view. 75 In terms of attitudes towards the rights that cohabiting couples should have in relation to each other's property, there is some support (40% of respondents) for the proposition that cohabiting couples should have rights to fi nancial provision, and very strong support (91% of respondents) for the suggestion that, where one partner dies intestate leaving a house in his or her name, a cohabitant should have the same rights to keep the house as if he or she were married. 76 There is also strong support for a right of a cohabitant to claim from the estate of a predeceasing partner, even where there is a will or a surviving spouse.
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A persistent divergence exists between commonly-held beliefs about the law and the law itself. Common belief seems in many cases to be impervious to legal reality, even where this legal reality is of long or relatively long standing. Two examples illustrate the point. It has never been the case in Scotland that unmarried fathers have parental responsibilities and rights 78 in respect of their children.
Nonetheless, 34% of those surveyed in 2004 considered that an unmarried father had the same rights to take decisions about medical treatment as a married father.
79
Another example -taken this time from England -is the persistence of belief in the existence of "common law marriage" despite its abolition in that jurisdiction in 1753. 80 Whether the changes introduced by the 2006 Act will result in members of the public holding more accurate opinions on the state of the law remains to be seen, but this evidence is not encouraging. Indeed it might be argued that the legislation will simply make matters worse, with people being unable to distinguish between the rights provided by the 2006 Act and those inhering in married couples and civil partners. On the other hand, if the legal consequences that distinguish marriage and civil partnership from cohabitation came to be understood by the general public, any support for maintaining them might fall away. For if there is no very clear line between registered and non-registered relationships, what, it might be asked, is the purpose of having a line at all? The basis for the public support called in aid of the present limited reforms could very well be transformed into a public perception that, in the absence of any opt-out provision for those who do not wish to be subject to the 2006 Act and no very clear reason for making the distinction, no distinction ought to be made. The logical extension of this view is that no legal consequences should follow from marriage or cohabitation, or alternatively that all cohabiting relationships, whether registered or not, should be subject to an identical regime of legal rights and responsibilities.
D. COHABITATION, MARRIAGE AND PARTNERSHIP
Some of the diffi culties of interpretation discussed above derive from a lack of clarity in formulating the underlying rationale for the cohabitation reforms incorporated in the 2006 Act. There are three questions which are not satisfactorily answered: why give cohabitants rights in the fi rst place? what sort of rights should they have? and why should there be a distinction between the position of cohabitants and that of spouses?
Some commentators have argued that cohabitation is functionally identical to marriage (at least where children are involved): 81 namely a joint enterprise principally of sexual intimacy, companionship, emotional and fi nancial support, home making and child bearing and rearing, which is helpful to society as a whole… Arguments of this kind are neither uncontroversial nor clear, 82 and may conceal variations within cohabitation relationships and marriages. In addition, these arguments often seem to focus, as in the quotation above, on the existence of children, which might lead one to suggest that the distinction should not be between spouses and cohabitants but between parents and others. 83 Even if we accept the arguments about functional and other similarities, it does not follow that cohabitants should be treated in the same way as spouses -as opposed to
Vol 11 2007 the edinburgh law review changing the way in which spouses are treated to take into account the sorts of factors which are brought into play when considering the entitlement of cohabitants. In other words, the arguments beg the more general question of the basis of entitlement to a fi nancial settlement arising out of the existence and subsequent termination of a relationship. Again, in the background to the 2006 Act there is little consideration of this issue aside from general references to fairness; yet the reasons for conferring rights clearly infl uence what rights are actually conferred and how these are formulated and put into practice.
Commentators have suggested a variety of possible rationales, such as the existence of a relationship between the parties, 84 the existence of a sexual relationship, marriage, parenthood, intention, contribution, reliance, partnership and need. 85 Each presents diffi culties. Intuitively it may be diffi cult, for example, to see the justifi cation for compensation for the termination of a sexual relationship or the failure of intimacy. Similarly, it is diffi cult to see how, in themselves, other factors (such as the fact of marriage or parenthood) justify a compensatory award, and diffi cult to apply the justifi cations in practice. How, for example, should contributions be assessed, especially where their nature is radically different? Importing the concept of compensation into a relationship may be artifi cial and give rise to diffi culties such as those experienced in the concept of implied intention and the nature of reliance within a relationship in English trust law. 86 In the end the compensatory argument usually seems to resolve itself into a notion of compensation for the economic detriment suffered by one of the parties as a result of the relationship. 87 This is captured by Mee who argues that the justifi cation for legislating in this area lies in:
88 the state's interest in avoiding injustice upon the termination of a relationship where the parties were economically and emotionally interdependent and relied on the relationship rather than their separate legal entitlements to secure their fi nancial well-being.
Conferring property rights on cohabitants might also be justifi ed by the sorts of arguments which are traditionally invoked to justify property rights and particular allocations of private property. 89 So, for example, a property right might be based on labour (or more broadly, overall contribution to the partnership), desert, contract (express or implied), or general considerations of distributive justice. Some of these are attended with diffi culty. For example, assessing labour faces the same problems as apply to assessment of contribution in the compensatory approach, and there is scope for discussion and disagreement as to the basis of desert.
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Whatever the rationale for compensation, there remains the issue of how such compensation is to be assessed. Two possible approaches have been identifi ed.
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One focuses on compensation for loss, for example in respect of any fi nancial contribution made to property used in the cohabitation as well as for the value of economic detriment. The other views the cohabitants as economic partners and looks at the whole wealth of the cohabitation with a view to reaching a fair sharing of assets. Clearly, the outcome produced by such approaches may often be different. Take, for instance, the case of a cohabitation lasting 25 years where the home was, and remained, in the name of one partner and was improved by him or her out of income, while the other partner limited his or her participation in the workforce in order to look after children who are now grown-up. Adopting a contribution approach would focus on fi nancial and other contributions made as well as possible economic advantage or disadvantage. A partnership approach would take a broader view and focus on the value of partnership assets, which could for these purposes be regarded as including the house where much of the increase in value is likely to have taken place.
Given the similarities between marriage and cohabitation, the more fundamental question of why spouses and cohabitants should be dealt with differently is not made clear either by the Executive or by the Scottish Law Commission. There seems to be an underlying assumption that marriage is in some way distinctive; but, aside from the fact that some formal process has been undergone, it is diffi cult to extract what the differences are supposed to be. The priority given to marriage is made more diffi cult to understand by the comment of the Deputy Justice Minister that the 2006 Act is not designed to promote marriage; 92 yet if marriage is not worth promoting, it is unclear why it should remain distinctive and confer far greater rights to property than cohabitation. To this there are a variety of possible answers. One is that when a couple marry (or enter into a 90 There is a vast literature on the justifi cations of property, and it would be impossible to cite even the most important sources here. Vol 11 2007 the edinburgh law review civil partnership) they take a deliberate decision in the knowledge of the legal consequences. As we have seen, however, it appears that the public grasp of these legal consequences is at least as vague as the grasp of the legal consequences of cohabitation. 93 In addition, marriage, like cohabitation, 94 is likely to be entered into for reasons unconnected with legally conferred rights. Furthermore, the law has already intervened to confer rights on cohabitants and otherwise treat them in the same or a similar way to spouses. Examples of the former include occupancy rights under the Matrimonial Homes (Family Protection) (Scotland) Act 1981 and rights to inherit tenancies both in the public and private sectors. 95 Examples of the latter include the benefi ts and tax systems. 96 Thus the suggestion that there is some basic policy that couples should not acquire rights and responsibilities without some overt commitment is fl awed, and no convincing case is made for distinguishing rights on separation and death from other types of rights which cohabitants already have. We offer no view here as to which of these rationales should be adopted, 97 but merely point out that different rationales can bring about different outcomes. For example, the justifi cation of the 2006 Act as protecting the vulnerable suffers, perhaps fatally, from the diffi culty of defi ning the precise nature of the vulnerability and how it is to be assessed. What this justifi cation does raise, however, is the question of whether the problem which the 2006 Act (and other legislation in the same area) is seeking to address involves broader social issues. One such issue is the relative economic position of men and women as a consequence of either direct or indirect discrimination. For example, part-time work during childcare may have a continuing adverse effect on economic prospects. Another issue arises from the fact that many of those who cohabit and have children are economically vulnerable (although not as a result of the cohabitation). 98 In such cases, the partner is unlikely to be able to ameliorate the position on termination of the relationship as that partner too will be economically vulnerable. In both of these cases one might ask whether a remedy which focuses on individual applicants at the end of individual relationships is either an appropriate or an effective method of proceeding. One of the reasons for not making more far-reaching provision in the case of cohabitants was the desire to avoid infringing personal autonomy. 99 What is not specifi cally addressed is how this conclusion is consistent with the considerable intervention into the lives of cohabitants which existed prior to the Act (and is noted above) or why any particular point is the correct point for state intervention to end. Also lacking is any real consideration of whether broader social concerns about justice, redistribution or vulnerability justify a greater degree of intervention than that effected by the Act. It is true that many couples enter cohabitation with the deliberate intention of avoiding the fi nancial consequences of marriage, but the question is whether the needs of this group are adequately addressed by the possibility of opting-out of the legal regime set out in legislation. One might argue that this group is more likely to be aware of the consequences of cohabitation and take the appropriate steps to avoid them than the sizeable group who believe that cohabitation produces more rights than it actually does. In other words, the provisions of the Act go too far for those who most value personal autonomy but not far enough for those who think that cohabitants already have more rights than they actually do. While the former may choose to opt-out of the provisions of the Act by contractual agreement (although separate problems may arise if such agreements were to be tested in the court), the latter may fi nd themselves disappointed by the relative weakness of the provisions. There are also further diffi culties regarding the coherence of the project. Despite the claims made by the Scottish Executive as to fl exibility, the provisions of the 2006 Act treat cohabitation as if it were a category with clear boundaries and a substantial core of meaning shared by all cohabitants. There is considerable evidence that this is not the case. Recent research has shown that the reasons given by cohabitants for not marrying fall into four broad categories. First, there are those who believe that cohabitation carries the same legal consequences as marriage (the so-called "myth" of common-law marriage). Secondly, there are those who wish to distinguish emotional from fi nancial commitment and believe that the avoidance of legal consequences renders their relationship more "pure". Thirdly, there are those who see themselves as being "as good as married" and do not see any need for a formal ceremony unless accompanied by lavish and expensive celebration at some later date. Lastly, there are those who actively wish to avoid marriage either as a manifestation of patriarchy or as a result of personal 99 See, for example, Scottish Executive, Family Matters (n 4) 27 (referring to a "need to avoid undue Government intervention in private lives"); Scottish Law Commission, Report on Family Law (n 1) para 16.15 ("We do not favour a comprehensive system of fi nancial provision on termination of a cohabitation comparable to the system of fi nancial provision on divorce in the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985. That would be to impose a regime of property sharing, and in some cases continuing fi nancial support, on couples who may well have opted for cohabitation in order to avoid such consequences.") Vol 11 2007 the edinburgh law review disillusionment. 100 Given these differences, the question of why and in what form legal intervention may be justifi ed becomes particularly important. How relevant are individual motives, and how (if at all) can they to be taken into account in legislation?
The issue of personal autonomy also raises the question of whether and to what extent it should be possible to contract out of legislation. The position appears to be that parties are free to enter into their own agreements about the fi nancial consequences of cohabitation, including an agreement to opt out of the statutory provisions -although the Scottish Law Commission's proposal to make this explicit in the Act was not taken up. 101 It will be interesting to see whether such agreements are common, as well as how they are regarded by the courts. For example, in view of possible inequalities in power, will the courts require that cohabitants have had access to legal advice before renouncing a claim?
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E. CONCLUSION
The provisions on cohabitants in the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 raise a number of issues. The policy refl ected in the Act as passed refl ects only confusion about where boundaries between personal choice, public policy and the role of the courts are to be placed and how confl icts between them are to be reconciled. We have sought to explore the meaning and coherence of the rationales put forward by the Scottish Executive in introducing the legislation and we conclude that neither the rationales themselves nor their meanings are clear. The "fi rm statutory foundation" that the Executive sought to provide has not, we think, been achieved. While aiming to provide remedial measures to rectify injustices experienced by cohabitants, the provisions of the Act have exposed a series of complex questions relating to the nature of intimate relationships, the expectations of the parties, and the relationship between property rights and affective ties. Unsurprisingly, all of these are manifested in the incoherence of the property rules set out in the 2006 Act. Furthermore, the broader justifi cations for making fi nancial or property provision in this context are deserving of more consideration from a Scottish perspective. Fuller consideration is also needed as to how these -or indeed the rationales put forward by the Scottish Executive -might be implemented.
